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EXPERT TESTIMONY IN EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEEDINGS:
OH FRYE, WHERE ART THOU?
FloridaDepartmentof Transportationv. Armadillo Partners,Inc.,
849 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 2003)
Justin Smith*
Respondent, a shopping center owner in Broward County, sought
damages resulting from an eminent domain taking by Petitioner, the
Florida Department of Transportation.' Petitioner's partial taking resulted
in a decrease in the number of available parking spaces on Respondent's
property.2 Respondent sought "severance damages" and compensation for
the property actually taken.3 Both parties agreed that the shopping center
would no longer be operable if improvements to the land were not
implemented after the taking.4
To minimize the impact of the partial taking, both sides submitted
"cures" as a way to improve the post-taking property.5 In support of its
proposal, each party presented expert testimony on the value of the
property after the taking and on the costs to cure.6 Petitioner's appraiser
testified regarding a cure that created additional parking by eliminating an
arbor area currently on the property.7 The appraiser estimated severance

* To my parents, for supporting me in everything I do.
1. Fla. Dep't of Transp. v. Armadillo Partners, Inc., 849 So. 2d 279, 281 (Fla. 2003) (per
curiam).
2. Id. The taking resulted in the loss of seventy-three parking spaces. Armadillo Partners,
Inc. v. State Dep't of Transp., 780 So. 2d 234,235 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), rev 'dpercuriam, 849 So.
2d 279 (Fla. 2003).
3. Armadillo Partners,Inc., 849 So. 2d at 281. The court defined "severance damages" as
"damage to the remainder caused by the taking... [or] damage caused by severing a part from the
whole." Id. at 283; see Div. of Admin., State Dep't of Transp. v. Frenchman, Inc., 476 So. 2d 224,
226 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985) (recognizing "that when less than the entire property is being
appropriated, full compensation for the taking of private property by eminent domain includes both
the value of the portion being appropriated and any damage to the remainder caused by the
taking").
4. Armadillo Partners,Inc., 849 So. 2d at 281.
5. Id. at 281-82. The court defined cures as "ways the remaining property could be improved
to minimize the effect of the partial taking on the value of the remaining property." Id. The court
went on to explain that "the 'cost to cure' is the cost of an attempt to ameliorate the damage to
value sustained by the property as a result of the partial taking by the government" Id at 285.
6. Id, at 282.
7. Id. Respondent asserted that the loss of the arbor area caused by implementation of the
cure constituted a separate element of damages. Id. at 284. Respondent wanted to treat the arbor
area loss as if it were a second taking. Id. The Florida Supreme Court disagreed, holding that a
property owner is entitled to no additional compensation if the change in use of the remaining
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damages resulting from the taking at $308,400, plus an additional
$102,300 for the cost to cure.! Respondent's appraiser calculated
severance damages at $493,000, and a cost to cure of $425,000. 9 At trial,
a jury returned a verdict awarding Petitioner $308,400 for severance
damages and $318,750 for the cure.' ° Respondent appealed to the Fourth
District Court of Appeal, which reversed the final judgment." Relying on
a series of cases from the First District Court of Appeal, the Fourth District
held that Petitioner's appraiser did not properly consider the necessary
factors in determining severance damages. 2 It found that the appraiser's
calculation failed to account for the loss in value caused by converting the
arbor area into parking.13 As a result, the Fourth District concluded that his
testimony should have been excluded. 14 The Florida Supreme Court
reversed and HELD, that the failure of an otherwise competent witness to
consider one of many factors in determining compensation goes to the
weight of his testimony, and not to his competency to testify as a witness. 5

property results in no decrease in fair market value. Id. at 285. In this case, the appraiser did not
consider the arbor area to have any impact on the fair market value of the property. Id at 286 n.5.
He only considered the arbor area in the context of rental value. Id. He concluded that, because
comparable rental properties in the neighborhood did not have trees, the property's rental value
would not suffer from losing the arbor area. Id.
8. Id. at 282.
9. Id. This "cut and reface" cure required the removal of "7000 square feet from the north
end of the north-south building, closing one of the driveways on Griffin Road, and reconfiguring
the parking lot to accommodate 99 parking spaces." Id.
10. Id The total compensation awarded was $817,450, which included $308,400 in severance
damages and $318,750 for the cost to cure. Id.
II. Id
12. Id.
13. Id
14. Id.
15. Id. at 287-88. The court's holding, which affirmed State Road Dep 't v. Falcon,Inc., 157
So. 2d 563 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963), is somewhat troubling for a property owner subjected to an
eminent domain taking. Armadillo Partners,Inc., 849 So. 2d at 290. In the instant case, both sides
agreed that if no action was taken to implement a cure, the shopping mall would no longer be
operable. Id. at 281. Petitioner's appraiser felt that the best available cure was to wipe out an arbor
area, consisting of a brick sidewalk, planted areas, an irrigation system, grass, and two wooden
arbor structures, and to relocate the lost parking there. Id at 282. Under this proposal, the owner
would get no compensation for the 'arbor area because the appraiser felt that it contributed nothing
to the fair market rental value of the property. Id. at 286 n.5. However, this calculation seems
inconsistent with the law of severance damages in Florida, which has adopted the "before-andafter" rule. Canney v. City of St. Petersburg, 466 So. 2d 1193, 1195 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (quoting
Jahoda v. State Rd. Dep't, 106 So. 2d 870, 872 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958). Severance damages are
determined by the difference in values pre-taking and post-taking. Id. The property in the instant
case had no value as a shopping center after the taking. ArmadilloPartners,Inc., 849 So. 2d at 281.
Action needed to be taken. Id. It seems difficult to consider an appraisal method that places no
value on a shopping center's arbor area as proper. At the very least the arbor area had some
aesthetic value, which is an appropriate consideration in severance damages, as the Petitioner's
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In Florida, when the government appropriates private property, the
affected landowner is entitled to a hearing to determine the amount of
compensation due.' 6 This right applies whether the government
appropriates the whole parcel or only a part of it.' 7 When the government
engages in a partial taking, the landowner is entitled to a form of
compensation known as severance damages.' 8 This amount is equal to the
decrease in value of the remainder parcel caused by the partial taking.' 9
Often, the loss in value caused by the taking is a contested issue
between the parties. To prove its theory of damages, a party may call on
expert appraisers to testify as to the amount of the decrease in value.20
Given that these expert appraisers have a great deal of influence on the
factfinder, requirements are in place to ensure competent expert
testimony.2' These requirements transform the scientific foundations of an
expert's testimony into initial matters of admissibility for the judge to
decide, rather than questions as to the weight of evidence for the jury to
decide.22
As evidentiary gatekeepers, judges in Florida are generally guided by
the principle laid down in Frye v. UnitedStates." Under Frye, an expert's

appraiser acknowledged. Id. at 286 n.5. This value seems especially appropriate when, as the
Petitioner's appraiser admits, the comparable properties in the neighborhood possess no such
feature. Id. This arbor area distinguished Respondent's property from the others, giving it a feature
unique from the comparable properties in the area. After the taking, Respondent faced a Catch-22:
implement the cure and receive no severance damages for the loss of the arbor area or be content
with the value of the land itself with a useless shopping center.
16. FLA. STAT. ch. 73.071(1) (2004).
17. Id. at ch. 73.071(3)(b).
18. Id.; Kendry v. Div. of Admin., State Dep't of Transp., 366 So. 2d 391, 394 (Fla. 1978);
Canney, 466 So. 2d at 1195 (adopting "before-and-after" rule under which severance damages are
calculated by the difference between pre-taking and post-taking values of the property).
19. Ch. 73.071(3)(b) (establishing that "[w]here less than the entire property is sought to be
appropriated, any damages to the remainder caused by the taking" may be awarded); see also supra
note 3.
20. See ch. 90.072 (establishing that if "specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact in
understanding the evidence. . ., a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education may testify about it in the form of an opinion").
21. Kruse v. State, 483 So. 2d 1383, 1386 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) ("We are aware... of the
danger that the trier of fact may place undue emphasis on evidence offered by an expert, simply
because of the special gloss placed on that evidence by reason of the witness's status as an
expert.").
22. Brim v. State, 695 So. 2d 268, 271 (Fla. 1997).
23. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923); Brim, 695 So. 2d at 271 (affirming that the Frye test is
utilized in Florida to ensure reliability of new or novel scientific evidence).
The Brim court emphasized that the Frye test is the appropriate test in Florida, despite the
federal courts' adoption of the more lenient standard in Daubertv. MerrellDow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Brim, 695 So. 2d at 271-72. The Frye test "requires a determination, by
the judge, that the basic underlying principles of scientific evidence have been sufficiently tested
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testimony is admissible only if the scientific principle or method upon
which the expert relies has "gained general acceptance in the particular
field in which it belongs."24 The Frye test ensures that only those methods
deemed generally accepted, and thus competent, will be heard by the factfinder.25
In State Road Department v. Falcon,Inc.,26 the Second District Court
of Appeal laid the foundation for the admissibility of expert testimony in
eminent domain proceedings." In Falcon,two expert appraisers testified
on behalf of the State Road Department as to the amount of compensation
to which they believed Falcon was entitled as a result of the taking.2" In
calculating damages, they analyzed sale prices of similar properties during
a five-year period.29 However, their calculation failed to account for a
transaction involving the sale of a Holiday Inn.3° Ordering a new trial, the
trial court held that the Department's appraisers' testimony was prejudicial
to Falcon, as the appraisers' failure to account for the Holiday Inn sale
caused them to underestimate the value of the appropriated land." On
appeal, the Second District Court of Appeal reversed, and held that the
failure of an otherwise competent witness to consider one of numerous
factors in determining compensation goes not to the competency of the
testimony, but only to its weight.32
Four years later, the Second District Court of Appeal, in Rochelle v.
State Road Department," further clarified the minimal burden an expert
appraiser must meet. 4 The State Road Department initiated an eminent
domain proceeding against Rochelle to appropriate land for the building
of a turnpike interchange." The Department's appraiser calculated

and accepted by the relevant scientific community." Id. at 272; see Castillo v. E.I. Du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 854 So. 2d 1264, 1268 (Fla. 2003) (reaffirming that "[t]o determine whether expert
testimony is admissible under section 90.702, Florida Statutes (2001), Florida courts follow the test
set out in Frye v. UnitedStates"); Hadden v. State, 690 So. 2d 573,576 (Fla. 1997) (stating that the
Frye test "requires that the scientific principles undergirding this evidence be found by the trial
court to be generally accepted by the relevant members of its particular field").
24. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
25. Id.
26. 157 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963).
27. Id. at 564.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. The State's appraiser calculated the value at $300-$350 per front foot, while Falcon's
appraisers valued the land at $850 per front foot. Id. A third appraiser valued it at $570 per front
foot. Id The jury awarded damages valued at $365 per front foot. Id.
32. Id. at 566.
33. 196 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967).
34. See id. at 479.
35. Id. at 478.
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damages by looking at the capitalization of a lease on the property, a new
method of appraising.36 The trial court held that use of this technique made
the appraiser's testimony incompetent, and the judge struck it from the
record." On appeal, the Second District Court of Appeal reversed, holding
that the method used by an expert appraiser does not relate to the
competency of the testimony, but is only relevant to its weight." Only
when the appraisal method is totally inadequate, improper, or entirely new
and unauthenticated will the court exclude the appraiser's testimony.39
While the Second District Court of Appeal was crafting a lenient
standard for expert appraiser admissibility, the First District Court of
Appeal was establishing a higher threshold. In State Department of
Transportationv. Murray,0 the First District Court of Appeal affirmed its
prior rulings excluding expert testimony when the appraiser improperly
calculated severance damages.4' In Murray, the Department of
Transportation took a portion of a restaurant owner's parking lot for a state
road expansion. 42 The Department of Transportation's appraiser planned
to testify that the loss could be replaced by adding parking spaces to the
ends of the existing lot and by striping a paved area used for overflow
parking. 43 The trial court excluded this cure testimony on the grounds that

36. Id. at 479.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.The Second District Court ofAppeal explained the minimal threshold for admissibility
by holding that the method adopted by the expert is not a matter related to the competency of his
testimony, "unless the method used by the witness is so totally inadequate or improper that
adoption of the method would require departing from all common sense and reason or would
require adoption of an entirely new and totally unauthenticated formula in the field of appraising."
Id.
40. 670 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (per curiam).
41. Id. at 979; see Williams v. State Dep't of Transp., 579 So. 2d 226, 229 (Fla. 1st DCA
199 1) (holding that "[wihere the testimony of an appraiser is based on a misconception of the law
resulting in a lower valuation of damages than if he had correctly applied the law, such testimony
should be excluded"); State Dep't ofTransp. v. Byrd, 254 So. 2d 836,836-37 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971)
(holding that the expert appraiser's failure to consider the loss of a shuffleboard area resulting from
the proposed cure made his testimony inconsistent with the law of severance damages, and its
subsequent exclusion by the trial court was proper).
In these cases, the State's appraiser proposed a cure to replace the lost parking by converting
another part of the landowner's property into spaces. Murray,670 So. 2d at 978; Williams, 579 So.
2d at 228; Byrd, 254 So. 2d at 836. The appraiser argued that because the lost parking spaces could
be relocated, there was no decrease in value to the remainder, and severance damages were zero.
Murray, 670 So. 2d at 978; Williams, 579 So. 2d at 228; Byrd, 254 So. 2d at 836. The First District
Court of Appeal disagreed because, according to the court, the appraiser had to account for the
reduction in available parking space or the lost shuffleboard area that would result from the
proposed cure. Murray, 670 So. 2d at 979; Williams, 579 So. 2d at 229; Byrd, 254 So. 2d at 836-37.
42. Murray, 670 So. 2d at 978. The taking resulted in a loss of thirteen parking spaces. Id.
43. Id.
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the appraiser failed to account for certain valuation factors in calculating
severance damages." Specifically, the appraiser's method ignored the
reduction in value of a restaurant with a smaller parking area for its
customers.45 Although the First District Court of Appeal quashed the trial
court's decision on other grounds, it affirmed the exclusion of the
Department of Transportation's appraiser's testimony.46
The Murray holding demonstrates the inconsistencies that developed
between the district courts of appeal in determining the admissibility of
appraiser testimony. Under the Second District's analysis in Falcon, the
testimony of the appraiser in Murray would have been found to be
competent, and thus admissible.47 Any failure to account for "valuation
factors" such as overflow parking loss would go to the weight of the
appraiser's testimony, and not to its competency. 48 Furthermore, the
method used by the appraiser in Murray would likely meet the minimal
threshold set by the Second District in Rochelle.49 So long as the Murray
appraiser's method would not "require departing from all common sense
and reason," it would be admissible under Rochelle."°
In the instant case, the Florida Supreme Court resolved these prior
ambiguities in determining whether expert appraiser testimony is
admissible."' Given that the First and Second District Courts of Appeal
were at opposite ends of the admissibility spectrum, the instant court had
two alternative views from which to choose. 2 The court explicitly adopted

44. Id. at 979.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 979-80.
47. See State Rd. Dep't v. Falcon, Inc., 157 So. 2d 563,566 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963) (holding that
an otherwise competent witness's failure to consider one of numerous factors in determining
damages goes not to the competency of his testimony, but only to its weight).
The court in Murray held the expert appraiser's testimony inadmissible because of his failure
to include the "reduction in value of the restaurant business with a smaller parking area." 670 So.
2d at 979. The Second District Court of Appeal would consider this just one factor that goes to the
weight of the expert's testimony, rather than to the competency of his appraisal method. Falcon,
157 So. 2d at 566.
48. Murray, 670 So. 2d at 979; see supra note 47.
49. See supra note 39.
50. Rochelle v. State Rd. Dep't, 196 So. 2d 477, 479 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967).
51. Fla. Dep't of Transp. v. Armadillo Partners, Inc., 849 So. 2d 279, 290 (Fla. 2003)
(overruling Murray,670 So. 2d 977, State Dep't of Transp. v. Byrd, 254 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 1st DCA
1971), and Williams v. State Dep't ofTransp., 579 So. 2d 226 (Fla. Ist DCA 1991), and affirming
Rochelle, 196 So. 2d 477, and Falcon, Inc., 157 So. 2d 563).
52. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text. In order for an appraiser's testimony to
be admissible, the First District Court of Appeal required the appraisal method to account for all
necessary factors in determining severance damages. See Murray, 670 So. 2d at 979. The Second
District Court of Appeal failed to account for "one of numerous factors," an issue of weight for the
jury, rather than of competency for the judge. Falcon, Inc., 157 So. 2d at 566.
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the principles laid down by the Second District." After the instant case,
expert appraiser testimony is admissible so long as the method employed
is within the minimal standard set forth in Rochelle.54 Even
unauthenticated and improper methods may be admissible, so long as they
are not a complete departure from common sense.55
Further reinforcing the rulings of the Second District, the instant court
held that any failure of an appraiser's method to account for the lost arbor
area would go only to the testimony's weight, not its competency.5 6 The
instant court noted, "even had DOT's expert failed to include the arbor
area in his valuation of severance damages, we conclude that this
exclusion would have gone to the weight, not the admissibility of his
testimony [sic].'7 If the appraiser believes that wiping out the arbor area
to relocate the lost parking will not alter the property's market value, then
he is allowed to testify to that effect.5"
By focusing on the weight the factfinder may give the appraiser's
testimony rather than on the admissibility of the appraiser's method, the
instant case takes a step away from Frye and its brethren. The purpose of
the Frye test is to ensure that only methods generally accepted within the
expert's field are admitted into evidence.59 Under Frye, if the judge finds
that the appraiser's methodology is not generally accepted within the
relevant community, the expert will never be able to exert his influence on
the jury.60 However, the instant court's holding requires a far lower
threshold, as the appraiser's testimony is admissible so long as the method
used to calculate damages is not "totally inadequate or improper. ' 61 The
Rochelle standard, adopted by the instant court, explicitly removes the
gatekeeping role ofthe judge in determining the competency of an expert's

53. Armadillo Partners,Inc., 849 So. 2d at 290.
54. Id.; see supra note 39 and accompanying text.
55. See supra note 39.
56. Armadillo Partners,Inc., 849 So. 2d at 287-88.
57. Id. at 288.
58. See supra note 7 (expert appraiser did not see the loss of the arbor area as affecting fair
market value of the property).
59. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
60. Id.
61. Armadillo Partners,Inc., 849 So. 2d at 287.
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methodology. 62 By adopting the Rochelle standard, the instant court seems
to have carved out an exception to Frye in eminent domain proceedings.63
Given the court's recognition of the fact that expert testimony carries
substantial weight with jurors,' this exception is problematic. In both the
instant case and Falcon, the court allowed the State's expert appraiser to
testify as to his estimate of severance damages. 65 The jury in the instant
case awarded the exact amount of severance damages recommended by the
State's appraiser,66 and in Falcon, the jury awarded an amount nearly
identical to the appraiser's estimated value.67 If the jury awarded severance
damages based on a method that was not generally accepted within the
appraising field, its decision may have rested on highly speculative and
unsupported evidence: the exact result sought to be prevented by
safeguards like Frye.6
Rather than undermining the Frye test by adopting the Rochelle
standard,69 the instant court could have disposed of this case by focusing
solely on the appraiser's failure to consider the lost arbor area. The
appraiser's methodology could have been held competent under Frye.7"
62. Rochelle v. State Rd. Dep't, 196 So. 2d 477,479 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967). The court held that
"the method of evaluation used by an appraiser-expert witness is not a matter relating to the
competency of his testimony to be ruled upon by the trial Judge." Id. Only where "adoption of the
method would require departing from all common sense and reason" is the trial judge permitted to
exercise discretion and declare the expert's testimony inadmissible. Id.
While it expressly affirms the Rochelle standard, the instant court gives no guidance as to how
the trial judge is to apply it. Armadillo Partners,Inc., 849 So. 2d at 290. The instant court's
acquiescence in the words "departing from all common sense," "totally unauthenticated," and
"totally inadequate or improper," suggest that an expert appraiser's testimony will almost never be
inadmissible. Id. at 287.
63. See Armadillo Partners,Inc., 849 So. 2d at 287-88; see supra note 39.
64. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
65. See supra note 8 and accompanying text; supra note 31.
66. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
67. See supra note 31.
68. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text; see alsoArmadillo Partners,Inc., 849 So.
2d at 293 (Lewis, J., dissenting) (noting that "[c]ontrary to assisting the trier of fact, such testimony
will mislead factfinders, resulting in erroneous and inequitable jury verdicts").
69. See supra note 51 (affirming Rochelle v. State Rd. Dep't, 196 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 2d DCA
1967)); see also supra note 39 (describing the Rochelle standard of admissibility as adopted by
Second District Court of Appeal).
70. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The State's appraiser in
the instant case made his calculation of severance damages by looking at comparable rental values
in the area. Armadillo Partners,Inc., 849 So. 2d at 286 n.5. He concluded that, because other
similar properties did not have arbor areas, removing Respondent's arbor area would not
detrimentally affect the rental value of the property. Id. The focus under Frye would not be on the
appraiser's failure to consider the arbor area, but on his chosen method of comparing rental values
of similar properties. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text. Comparing sales, or in this
case rentals, is the method preferred in the majority of American jurisdictions, likely giving it the
level of general acceptance required by Frye. 4 NICHOLS' THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN,
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Consistent with Falcon,"' the instant court could have found that the
appraiser's failure to account for the loss of the arbor area was only
relevant to the weight of his testimony.' By adopting this alternative
disposition, the court could have ensured that the methodology adopted by
future expert appraisers would be subjected to the requirements of Frye,
instead of the minimal threshold set by Rochelle."' As a result, property
owners would not have to fear that, if their land is taken by the
government, their compensation could be based on improper or
unauthenticated methodology.
Furthermore, this reasoning would have resolved the inconsistency
between the court's treatment of experts in eminent domain proceedings
and its treatment of experts in other fields.74 The instant court made no
effort to deny that these appraisers were experts, as the court explicitly
referred to them as such throughout the opinion." However, the instant
court adopted a standard of admissibility for appraisers that differs from
the one used for expert testimony in a worker's compensation dispute or
a murder prosecution.76 Whereas a pesticide specialist testifying on
causation in a worker's compensation claim will have to show that his or
her methodology is generally accepted, an expert appraiser need only show
that his or her method is not a complete departure from common sense.77

§ 12B.04(3) (Julius L. Sackman ed., rev. 3d ed., Matthew Bender 2003) (1964); see Nour v. Div.
of Admin., State Dep't of Transp., 267 So. 2d 365, 366 (Fla. Ist DCA 1972).
71. State Rd Dep't v. Falcon, Inc.,157 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963).
72. Id. at 566.
73. See Frye, 293 F. at 1014; supra note 39 and accompanying text.
74. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
75. ArmadilloPartners,Inc., 849 So. 2d at 281 (noting that "both parties submitted proposals
and expert opinion testimony"). The most concrete evidence of the instant court's categorization
of the appraisers as experts is the section of its opinion called "Expert Opinion Testimony" and its
reference to chapter 90.072 of the Florida Statutes. Id. at 286-88. The instant court decided Castillo
v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 854 So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 2003), two months after handing down
the decision in ArmadilloPartners,Inc. See Castillo,854 So. 2d 1264 ("July 10, 2003, Decided");
Armadillo Partners,Inc., 849 So. 2d 279 ("April 24, 2003, Decided"). In Castillo,the instant court
did not attempt to undermine its support for Frye in determining whether expert testimony is
admissible. Castillo,854 So. 2d at 1268. In fact, it expressly stated that when deciding "whether
expert testimony is admissible under section 90.702, Florida Statutes (2001), Florida courts follow
the test set out in Frye v. United States." Id. The court's opinions are inconsistent. It cited section
90.702 in Armadillo Partners,Inc., only to apply the minimal standard of Rochelle, and then cited
the same statute two months later and held that the Frye test is appropriate for applying the statute.
Compare Armadillo Partners,Inc., 849 So. 2d at 288, 290, with Castillo,854 So. 2d at 1268. At
no point in Castillo does the court attempt to reconcile these inconsistencies by overruling or
distinguishing Armadillo Partners,Inc. Castillo, 854 So. 2d at 1268-80.
76. See United States Sugar Corp. v. Henson, 823 So. 2d 104, 106-07 (Fla. 2002) (applying
Frye test to worker's expert opinion testimony); Arnold v. State, 807 So. 2d 136, 138-40 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2002) (applying Frye test for expert testimony related to DNA analysis in burglary trial).
77. See supra notes 39, 76 and accompanying text.
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Simply by deciding the instant case under the Falcon rule, rather than
adopting the standard from Rochelle, the instant court could have avoided
this unexplained inconsistency in determining the admissibility of expert
testimony.
The instant court's decision has opened the door, although it is unclear
how far, for unauthenticated appraiser testimony to reach juries. The
instant case stresses flexibility in admitting expert testimony, where prior
Florida cases stressed rigid safeguards.78 In abandoning the Frye test and
adopting the Rochelle standard to determine whether expert appraiser
testimony is admissible, the instant court that has departed from common
sense and reason.

78. See supra text accompanying notes 58-62.
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